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Introduction: constructing companion animals on social media  
Daphne is a female cat whose story was publicly unveiled on the Facebook page of a 
Portuguese animal shelter. An ‘official’ post describes how she was returned to the shelter 
one year after being taken into the guardianship of the very same female adopter who was 
now returning her. Daphne is described as being deeply sad and even ‘depressed,’ as shown 
by her behavior of almost permanent stillness, lack of appetite and (voluntary) starvation 
(refusing to eat what she is given). The shelter’s post reports that she was accused (by the 
former adopter) of urinating outside her sandbox, and of disturbing the conjugal relationship 
between the adopter and the latter’s partner. The post proceeds to announce that Daphne is 
again available for adoption, and to regret attitudes that cause animals to be relinquished on 




However, this is not the only version of Daphne’s story. On the very day of its publication, 
Daphne’s former guardian (hereafter called ‘the adopter’) posted a long comment correcting 
his gender identity (male, and not female) and explaining his own version of the events, in 
their various stages: the decision to adopt and the route leading to it, involving the shelter; 
the phase in which Daphne shared his life and home; and her return to the shelter. He 
describes Daphne’s adaptation to her new home as a very difficult process, during which she 
could not get along with the other cat, or with the humans living in the house. She is described 
as being unsociable, always hiding and avoiding contact, and finally engaging in certain 
behaviors intentionally, such as urinating on her guardians’ clothes, or huffing and snorting. 
In this version, she was not happy, and returning her to the shelter was a painful act which 
was reckoned the better way to find her another family and home where she could be happier. 
Some of these problems are attributed to Daphne’s age, which made it more difficult for her 
to adjust to her new home.  
This version, as one might expect, differs considerably from the shelter’s, both in language 
and in tone. This article explores the construction of multiple versions of Daphne, as an 
individual; cats as a species; and companion animals in general, and the role that the 
particular time and space of social media play in this process. Its innovative contribute to the 




the concept of animal practices (Law & Miele 2011), to better understand human relations 
with companion animals, namely cats; by addressing the ways non-human animals and 
human-animal boundaries are done, and undone, in the context of social media and digital 
media practices. In this way, I expect to make a contribution to a sociology for nonhuman 
animals (Peggs, 2013), and for humans alike: by increasing our awareness of the ways 
humans socially categorize and relate to nonhuman animals, sociological thinking may play 
an important part in the improvement of interspecies relations, and hence in the life 
conditions of both humans and nonhumans. 
Let us then enter Daphne’s story by responding to two main questions. How is a companion 
animal defined, in digital discursive practices performed in social media? How does this kind 
of digital interaction contribute to the renegotiation of human-animal boundaries? 
 
The specific condition of cats, as companion animals 
Drawing on literature from the field of Animal Studies, the discussion that the topic sparks 
links to the fact that Daphne is, in fact, a cat. That is to say that she is not really an animal, 
but rather a companion animal, getting attention due to this specific condition (vis-à-vis other 




has a personal name. She shares (or shared) the domestic space with humans, often viewed 
as a member of the family (Charles and Davies, 2008; Charles, 2014). As sharing a status of 
affective proximity to humans, she is inedible, and therefore will never be eaten (Fudge, 2002 
and 2008). And she is viewed and referred to as an individual with a personality of her own, 
rather than simply a member of a species, in this case felines. Like most companion animals, 
she is deemed ‘family,’ the blurred boundaries between humans and non-humans thus 
contributing to the definition of what a contemporary family is: relational, based on emotions 
and affects; and individualistic, where the individual is expected to flourish with the help of 
the family group, be that individual human or non-human.  
She therefore occupies, like most companion animals, a liminal condition (Fudge, 2002 and 
2008), that makes her status and position ambiguous: she lies somewhere in-between humans 
and animals; she is neither ‘completely an animal,’ nor is she completely human either. This 
liminality is intensified by her gender condition: being a female, she is expected to behave 
with docility and tenderness, developing with her human guardians an affectionate 
relationship. She is thus criticised for not complying to gender norms and behaviours, her 
animality being built alongside her gender. Moreover, due to her condition as a companion 
animal (either effective or prospective), she gains much more visibility than other animals, 




she (involuntarily) participates in the ‘visible/invisible’ conundrum (Fudge, 2002 and 2008; 
Cole and Stewart, 2014), whereby the fact that some animals (companion animals) gain 
increasing visibility (including in political terms and the pledge to support animal rights) may 
paradoxically result in the invisibility of others (animals raised for food, entertainment, 
clothing).  
Moreover, because she is a cat, Daphne certainly occupies a better position than other animals 
in the hierarchy of pets, as cats and dogs are rated as closer to humans than other companion 
species (birds, mice, fish and especially reptiles) (Redmalm, 2014). However, despite all the 
attention she seems to get from the Facebook community of ‘animal-lovers’ gathering around 
the animal shelter’s Facebook page, Daphne is also subject to a somewhat unstable 
subjectification. She is made a ‘subject,’ with a personality of her own, and rights attached 
to it, but only under certain conditions (Fudge, 2008): adaptation to human lifestyles, not 
being aggressive, being friendly, and adjusting to the home and its inhabitants. This 
instability and conditionality of her definition as a member of a ‘preferred’ species, deemed 
as closer to humans than other species, results in conflicting versions of her, and in the varied 
moral judgments passed on her story and its protagonists.  
 




Critical animal scholars argue that the ways animals are depicted in mainstream media 
reproduce and legitimize dominant ideologies of antroparchy and speciesism, playing a role 
in maintaining nonhuman animals under human domination (Almirón et al 2018). This 
implies a critique of legitimated categories such as ‘meat’, ‘pet’ or even ‘animal’, exposed 
as social and political constructs of a hegemonic (human, white, male, young) order, working 
as part of the ‘machine without a centre’ of anthropocentrism (Agamben, 2004; Filippi, 
2017). Although these approaches sometimes overlook other aspects of human-animal 
relations, such as the agency of nonhuman animals, or the more web-based, unstable nature 
of power relations between species, some of their questions can be extended to social media. 
The narrativization of Daphne’s story takes place in a very particular setting: the official 
Facebook page of a Portuguese animal shelter. This means that we have to consider the 
specific features of this social media platform and the mediated interactions it enables.  
As a social media platform, Facebook constitutes a tool with in-built communication 
features, frequently used to communicate with other users, networked through specific 
technological properties. It presents particular technological features that are appropriated by 
individuals, who transform them as social resources to better connect with others. These 
‘affordances’ (Baym, 2010; McVeigh-Schultz and Baym, 2015), such as the timeline, the 




multimedia messages (text, video, image), make it a particular time-space where interactions 
and experiences acquire a specific nature.  
The ways in which these technological features are used is key to understand their impact, as 
many have documented (eg Baym, 2010; Chambers, 2013; Couldry, 2012; Lambert, 2015; 
Madianou, 2016). Thriving on emotions and the affective engagement of users with the 
contents displayed, social media also rely on the active involvement of users, who become 
both producers and consumers of such emotions and affective states. Such uses are rooted in 
the ebb and flow of personal life, in particular the need to build a lifetime, family or friendship 
memory, to produce a meaning for their own existence, or to be constantly in contact with 
others, thus adhering to a social norm of being in a permanent relational continuum 
(Policarpo, 2019). As such, the ways users engage in the discussion around Daphne’s story 
will resort, to a certain extent, to elements of their own personal experience and daily life 
with companion animals, both used to construct specific worldviews and positioning towards 
the story, and the topics involved.  
I argue that these features contribute to extend human-animal practices in time and place, in 
specific ways, thus making social media distinctive in their production. In the following 




produced by its users. Such a capacity relates in particular with two features: reach and 
mobility (Baym 2010). Other features are also critical, such as interactivity and replicability. 
 
Animal practices on Facebook 
Critical to understand how social media practices contribute to defining what an animal is 
(as defined by humans) is the notion of ‘animal practices.’ Drawing on Science and 
Technology Studies, and following a Theory of Practice approach, Law and Miele (2011) 
propose that animals do not pre-exist the practices they are involved in. Rather, they are the 
relational effects of those practices, in which they too participate. They are being done in the 
unfolding of actions, as well as all other participants in those practices and contexts – humans, 
and other non-humans (objects, technology, etc.).  
I argue that the legacy of ANT (Latour 1999, 2005; Law 1999) helps to shed light into the 
ways companion animals participate in wider networks of relations and assemblages, that 
enable them to ‘become what they are’. These animals participate in practices with other 
humans and non-humans, some of which extend beyond the physical scene they inhabit. 
Here, technology and social media become particularly relevant, as the animals’ participation 




through a range of social media practices. They extend themselves beyond the scenes in 
which the ‘flesh and blood’ animal participates.  
Hence, the animal becomes ‘who he is’ through complex and extensive webs of relations. In 
some of these networks, he participates directly. In others, he is evoked. All of them concur 
to the emergent definition either of a particular individual (eg. ‘our cat’); or of the species to 
which he belongs. This definition, and its multiple versions, reflect and impact on the ways 
humans relate to these animals, and thus on their lives and welfare. It also contributes to build 
a story as much of (human-animal) conflict, as of wilderness and resistance – versions of 
‘less domesticated’ animals, who resist human dominion.  
According to this perspective, animals are beings constantly ‘in the making’, relationally 
‘becoming with’ the humans and non-humans around them. Social media practices are one 
type of social practices, among others, that contribute to this constant ‘making’ of the 
animals, as parts of the networks and assemblages to which they belong. It could be argued 
that, because Daphne has a body, materiality would impose itself as pre-existent and stable. 
However, her body is also affected and shaped by her interactions with her environment, 
other animals and material elements. It is also the result of all these fluctuating elements, that 
change in time, place and power (eg. the skinny/starving body, the fat/well fed body, the 




As a result of these ever changing, specific, practices, different, and sometimes conflicting, 
versions of the same animal can be enacted. For example, at the veterinary surgery, the same 
animal, infected with a contagious disease, may emerge both as a sentient-being, demanding 
special care and attention to their wellbeing; and as an infectious-agent, an animal that must 
be put in quarantine to avoid contamination of other animals, humans and non-humans.  
Therefore, far from being an ontological and static reality, an animal is better described as a 
contingent, unstable, and ongoing becoming with humans, other non-human animals, spaces, 
and objects, other natural environmental and contextual elements. From this perspective, the 
authors talk about relationally emergent versions of the animal. ‘Animals are the 
heterogeneous material and relational consequences of specific and patterned ordering 
practices that extend beyond local scenes to include more or less distant times and places’ 
(Law and Miele, 2011, p. 62). ‘Animal practices’ in relation to Daphne encompass a wide 
range of contexts and actors: those described in the versions of her story (at home, at the 
shelter); but also the digital discursive practices that evolve from the narrativization of her 
life.  
In the following section, I will explain the methodological options that structured the 
approach to the empirical data. I will then proceed to explore the discourses made public on 




narratives about the case (‘trigger’ and ‘counter’), eventually leading to the emergence of 
different versions of the same cat. 
 
Research Methodology 
This article draws on the analysis of one particular case study: the story of the cat Daphne, 
as described in one post of the official Facebook page of a Portuguese animal shelter, 
published in 2017. Both human and non-human participants in the digital story are fully 
anonymized: the animal shelter is not identified, nor is the human or the cat, named with the 
pseudonym ‘Daphne’. These standard anonymization procedures have as a main purpose to 
preserve the participants’ identities and privacy, despite the fact that the Facebook page is 
public, and therefore so is its content. For the same reasons, verbatim quotes from participants 
were avoided, and the contents of their discourses paraphrased in order to avoid 
identification. Analysis of public content published on Facebook also followed the principle 
of ‘fair use’.  
The first post, of the animal shelter, gathered a voluminous and prolonged stream of 
responses from Facebook users. At the time of writing, the post and its subsequent comments 




sadness and other emotions), more than 900 comments, and around 700 shares. In a 200-
word text, it sets the tone of the discussion that followed. A post from the adopter followed 
it, gathering around 400 reactions from Facebook users, and around 170 comments. Because 
these were the first posts, and the adopter’s post immediately followed the initial one from 
the shelter, they gathered important comments, both in length and in content. Many were 
comments about these comments, and not about the original messages. The subsequent 
interpretations draw on a qualitative analysis of this sub-sample of 170 comments on the 
adopter’s post, which include reactions to the initial post from the shelter. 
The article draws on two different types of analysis, in order to explore the latent categories 
contributing to define, and therefore construct, non-human animals on these digital 
landscapes. Firstly, narrative analysis enabled, for each one of the two main posts, the 
identification of the plot line, its main characters, and tones of discourse. The analysis aimed 
primarily at practices, rather than discourses, a turn documented as privileging a focus on 
interaction at a local level, an emphasis on the contextualizing power of narratives, and a 
commitment to social-theoretical concerns (De Fina and Georgakopoulou, 2015, p. 3). This 
‘practice-based’ approach, oriented towards the capture of how small stories are embedded 
in everyday life, and are part of the ‘fabric of social practices that ordinary people engage 




266). A-typical features of small stories emerge from digital platforms and practices, such as 
fragmentation, open-endedness or multiple authoring of a post, enhancing their proliferation. 
The practices of storytelling in social media are also often anchored in reporting events from 
the poster’s daily life. Elements that can be found in the making of Daphne’s story, both 
directly, in the posts of the shelter and the adopter; and indirectly, in the posts where users 
describe details of their own daily lives with animal companions. 
Secondly, content analysis using qualitative data analysis software NVivo 10 enabled the 
extraction of the main thematic categories in the posts of both the shelter and the adopter, as 
well as of the users that subsequently commented on them. The analysis followed an 
inductive, grounded, procedure, privileging a logic of discovery, without a previous set of 
pre-determined categories. It produced 41 principal nodes (categories), of which 7 included 
child-nodes. Some verbatim expressions were captured as in-vivo categories that suggested 
insights into the way Daphne in particular, or companion animals in general, were being 
depicted in the online exchanges. Besides the verbal text in the posts and comments, the 
analysis also took into account the formal content of the social media affordances, enacted 
by users as they contributed to the making of the story. This included the consideration, in 




laughter, surprise, cry, sadness and anger), emoticons or posting of visual content (photos, 
video). 
Although both these types of discourse analysis may be less common in ANT, their use is 
justified by the fact that social media offer a particular landscape for storytelling, as part of 
wider social practices, which they also contribute to outline. The following section explores 
precisely the power of social media stories, as told by their users, to perform human-animal 
practices. 
 
Animal practices on Facebook and the emergent versions of Daphne 
The characters involved in the storyline are not always easy to identify. One could begin by 
saying that the leading role belongs, obviously, to Daphne the cat. However, that is not 
always the case. Nevertheless, it is Daphne who opens up the storyline, even if only 
indirectly. Other leading characters are the animal shelter, who discloses Daphne’s story, and 
the adopter. Mainly in secondary roles, we find all Facebook users, nearly all of them 
presented as female identities, who react to and post comments about Daphne’s story. Finally, 




posts; but who, just like Daphne, will become shadowed by the human narratives around 
them. 
The plot unfolds in two main narratives: the one presented by the animal shelter, what we 
call the ‘trigger-narrative,’ as it triggers all the subsequent discussion on the shelter’s 
Facebook page; and the ‘counter-narrative’ from the adopter, in which he presents his own 
version of Daphne’s story.  
 
The ‘trigger-narrative’  
The ‘trigger-narrative’ is the first one to be put forward, and in that sense leads the way to 
the construction of Daphne’s story in this virtual arena of Facebook. We can call it the 
‘hegemonic version,’ not only because it was posted by the institution that runs the Facebook 
page (thus becoming the ‘official’ version), but also because most posts and comments of the 
users will follow and expand it. This account is built around a tone of accusation of the 
adopter’s decision and behavior and, more subtly, of the adopter himself, as a wrongdoer 
lacking the moral qualities to be a proper guardian of a companion animal. In a 200-word 




A ‘juridical language’ evokes a judicial process, in which a defendant (the adopter) is already 
on trial. Initially, it is used to describe the behavior of the adopter toward Daphne, who was 
‘immediately accused and judged,’ without being given the right of defense, and was 
immediately ‘sentenced’ to return to the shelter. Then the direction of the storyline shifts, 
using the same (and other) juridical terms to refer to the adopter, but combined with 
psychological reasoning. Expressions such as ‘moral crime,’ ‘sentence’ or ‘trial’ are 
combined with more psychological and existential ones, such as ‘human emptiness’, ‘lack of 
interiority’, ‘absence of humanity’ or ‘existential void’. Claiming the role of a court of justice 
committed to restoring the ‘truth,’ the text declares Daphne ‘innocent’ and her sentence 
‘unfair’ and out of proportion. The text closes with an open, emotionally charged articulation 
of a moral judgment on the adopter’s behavior and on the dynamics of private and intimate 
life. Hence, it becomes a double moral judgment. 
 
The ‘counter-narrative’ 
In contrast, the ‘counter-narrative’ of the adopter is based much more on a description of 
facts, and is less emotionally charged. Published after the initial post from the shelter, its tone 
is mainly one of complaint and self-defense. In a much longer text (around 900 words), the 




attempt to conceal his identity. Then, his discourse is built up around four different types of 
language to convey his version of the story: ‘factual,’ ‘professional,’ ‘self-defensive,’ and 
‘animal-focused.’ 
The first distinctive feature is the ‘factual’ tone of the narrative. It focuses mainly on the 
description of facts and events, in an attempt to produce an objective and dispassionate 
account. This is in clear contrast to the post from the shelter, which takes a highly emotive 
tone in conveying its message. Here, rather than focusing on emotional states, the narrative 
presents facts in detail, following a temporal order. It reconstitutes the timeline of the 
adoption as a joint experience of both the adopter and the animal, starting from the point 
when he (and his partner) decided to adopt, proceeding through the contact with the shelter, 
the act of taking the animal home, the first times together, and the period in which the animal 
began to be perceived as problematic, and ending with the decision to return her to the shelter. 
The story is thus presented with a higher degree of complexity (mostly composed of ‘facts’) 
and emotions are not openly displayed. The descriptive and factual tone of the text suggests 
a distinction between rationality/emotionality, in which the rational (and factual) remain 
mostly on the side of the narrator (the adopter). 
This is not the same as saying that emotions are absent. Instead, they are managed with 




enacting a ‘masculinised rationality’ over ‘feminised emotionality’. They remain subtly 
suggested by the way the factual argumentation proceeds. This is true mainly concerning the 
evaluation of the shelter’s behavior, which the adopter accuses of misconduct and lack of 
professionalism. This is the second distinctive feature of the ‘counter-narrative’ of the 
adopter: the insistence on a ‘professional’ dimension of the events, rather than on exclusively 
personal and emotional ones. The adopter accuses the shelter of breach of confidentiality (eg 
displaying information about his private life) and of lying (eg about the age of the cat, or in 
their version of the facts) in order to achieve their goals, thus producing false declarations. 
The topic of the ‘lie’ (vs truth), namely about Daphne’s age, becomes particularly central to 
the storyline, as age emerges as an important feature of the adoption process, and hence of 
its (lack of) success. Moreover, the ‘lie’ prompts from the adopter a question about the 
shelter’s honesty and professional integrity. Therefore, an intention of public complaint and 
exposure of the shelter’s professional misconduct flows alongside that of ‘self-defense.’ The 
same thing happens with the shelter’s ‘trigger-narrative,’ in which this same intention of 
public exposure of the adopter’s misconduct accompanies the ‘juridical’ tone of accusation 
and trial. 
This narrative is also ‘animal-focused,’ in the sense that it explicitly talks about Daphne – 




personality (as a subject). It draws on the characteristics of her personality to describe her as 
‘problematic’ and therefore to build a version of Daphne as disruptive, thus justifying the 
need to return her to the shelter. It depicts Daphne as a non-docile cat, who lacked social 
skills, and could not socialize either with the other cat, or with the humans living in the house 
(the adopter and his partner). She fled from all attempts at assimilation and could never adapt 
herself to her new home and family. Finally, the text describes how she displayed ‘less 
affectionate’ attitudes toward her human guardians, namely by huffing, snorting, and most 
of all urinating deliberately over her guardians’ clothes. The lack of docility emerges as a 
particularly important trait to define her. One can argue that this is also linked to her gender: 
being a female, Daphne fails to accomplish human expectations on both her animality and 
her gender (Cudworth 1998). Viewed as a non-docile female animal, she crosses the thin line 
between domestication and wilderness, impossible to control through ownership. This is how 
the description of Daphne’s behavior builds up toward justification of the need to return her 
to the shelter. Consequently, the discourse evolves toward a ‘self-defensive’ tone, which is 
where the ‘counter-narrative’ gets more emotional. On the one hand, due to the pervasive 
presence of feelings of injustice, the adopter declares his sense of being unreasonably accused 
and convicted, and his urge to restore justice by presenting ‘the truth about the facts.’ On the 




deliberation, just like the decision to adopt. A situation felt as unsustainable and ‘unhealthy’ 
for both parties involved pushes the humans first toward a dilemma, and then toward a 
decision felt as an emotional burden.  
 
Evolution of the storyline: how a tale of adoption becomes a tale of abandonment  
The vast majority of the comments triggered by the ‘counter-narrative’ are from users with 
feminine identities, and echo the ‘trigger-version’ as told by the shelter. The space to post a 
‘comment,’ a particular affordance of social media platforms, is also used by commenters to 
tell their own stories of their companion animals (cats, but also dogs), often problematic and 
pierced by conflict.  
The content analysis showed that the most frequently repeated themes were the behavior and 
personality of the animal (n=112), the return and/or abandonment of the animal (n=75), 
affects and emotions (n=73), kinship bonding (n=37) and mutual adaptation (humans to 
animal, n=17; animal to humans, n=15). Other frequent categories were the comments to the 
shelter (its work and way of conducting the case; n=29), meta-comments (n=27), ie 
comments without a proper content related to the topic, but just commenting on the tone or 
existence of a previous comment; and open insults (n=20). Two relevant categories for the 




behavior (and Daphne’s in particular; n=12), references to the adopter’s private and family 
life (eg conflicts; n=12), defense of the adopter (n=11), and the age of the animal (n=11).  
As the comments progress, the storyline evolves to become a tale of abandonment. All 
distinction between ‘return’ (to a shelter from where she had been adopted) and 
‘abandonment’ is erased. The two behaviors are equated with all consequent moral 
assumptions, namely in regard to the moral character of the adopter (as a ‘bad’ person, 
incapable of love for animals and humans) and the adopter’s behavior toward Daphne, 
namely returning her to the shelter. Intense emotions arise around the topic, but the main 
issue is always the appropriate behavior of a ‘good guardian,’ the moral ‘good qualities’ 
required to adopt a pet (eg enduring patience), the implications of the act of adopting (eg, 
lifelong, unbreakable commitment), and the social and psychological conditions needed to 
do so (eg not having too many animals, knowing how to take care of them, spending enough 
time with them).  
What about Daphne? How is she portrayed and what does that tell about the ways in which 






The ‘two-fold cat’: emergent versions of Daphne the Cat 
The discursive practices around Daphne’s life – her behavior, her moral intentions, her life 
with her human guardians, her disgrace in being returned to the shelter – evolve to produce 
two different, and emergent, versions of this particular companion animal. These practices 
are discursive, rely mostly on verbal (written) language, and take place in the digital time-
space of social media. Because these discourses elaborate upon Daphne’s behavior at home, 
first, and in the shelter, afterwards, Daphne participates in them indirectly. Nevertheless, and 
quite paradoxically, not only is she unaware of all the discussion taking place around her, but 
also of its possible impact on her future. Daphne is, thus, at the same time a participant and 
an absent element in this process, empowered and disempowered, or an ‘absent referent,’ to 
adapt Carol Adams’s (1990) expression. Just as the death of the animal who lies on the plate 
to be eaten remains absent to the meat-eater, so Daphne remains absent from these discursive 
practices in which her story is being remade. This absence cloaks the human dominion over 
her non-human condition, present in each act in which humans make decisions about her life, 
just as the absence of animal death hides the violence contained in the act of meat-eating. 
Hence, the ‘disappearance’ of Daphne ends by protecting the conscience of the humans 




Through such social media interactions, the reverberation and reinvention of the ‘animal 
practices’ in which she participates produce different and emergent versions of Daphne, as a 
cat. She becomes the effect of these ‘performative consequences of sets of somewhat 
choreographed but largely unknowable practices’ (Law and Miele, 2011, p. 50). This 
radically challenges essentialist assumptions about the ontological nature of non-human 
animals, as a ‘real’, pre-existent, essentialist, property of beings. Rather, the ‘real’ Daphne is  
a ‘being in the making’, emergent from the web of relations that involve her. Here, social 
media practices add to other social practices in which Daphne participates (in the home, in 
the shelter), and through which she is redefined. 
Animal practices are heterogenous, relational, extended in time and spaces, and quite 
specific, emerging from moment-by-moment patterns and flows (Law and Miele, 2011). 
They are heterogenous because they are composed of different kinds of elements: persons, 
objects, technologies and devices, buildings and material arrangements. In the complete 
presentation of Daphne’s story, the whole environment in which she is depicted is critical to 
the development of events: the other cat in the house, the desk underneath which she hides, 
the clothes in which she urinates, the cat litter, in which she was supposed to urinate always.  
All these play an important part in how the story unfolds, through a ‘bodily choreography’ 




all relevant components together in a specifically ordered manner. That is why they are 
relational. The many components of Daphne’s story (humans, animals, objects, space) only 
assume their exact form, their exact role, inside this relational frame in which all bodies move 
according to each other, in ‘bodily choreographies’: inside the house, Daphne stuck 
underneath a desk, Daphne and the other cat quarrelling, humans trying to feed her, Daphne 
huffing to the other cats and to her human guardians.  
Animal practices are also extended in time and space, which means that they depend on 
distant relations and contexts, including information technologies or transport systems. The 
patterns of these extended relations also need to be ordered. They are ‘relational patterns of 
ordering that reach beyond the scene.’ (p. 56). And this is particularly relevant to the case of 
Daphne, as it continues to be constructed beyond the material world in which she moves, in 
the digital dimension of social media. The relational patterns of ordered interactions between 
Daphne and all other elements (humans, other animals, objects, food, etc.) are re-signified 
and extended in meaning through its re-telling on social media. 
Finally, these practices are very specific; they are anchored in moment-by-moment patterns, 
such as the guardian’s description of trying, over the months, to reach Daphne, who kept 
resisting common patterns of socializing with humans and other cats. This specificity enables 




(companion) animals live together and share common spaces and times, sometimes fluidly, 
sometimes in conflicting ways. They make it possible to catch how practices may be 
inconsistent, contradictory and conflictual.  
Therefore, animal practices (like other forms of social practices) are performative. They do 
different things. And animals are the effects of those practices, in the sense that they are being 
done in the unfolding of actions. They are a consequence of the action as it unfolds, as a 
result of ‘different, complex and uncertainly related logics of materially heterogenous 
practice.’ (p. 60). Hence, the same animal may be enacted as different animals, in different 
versions, depending on the articulation of elements that compose specific practices.  
This is how two different versions of Daphne emerge from these ‘animal practices’ 
performed by humans on social media, which bear the specificity, despite referring to 
animals’ behaviors and lives, of animals themselves being unable to directly participate in 
them.  
On the one hand, there is the version of the ‘animal-victim,’ triggered by the animal shelter 
narrative, and amplified by all Facebook users who support it. Here, Daphne is presented as 
a disempowered victim of human mean conduct and lack of commitment, a passive subject 
of multiple and sequential forms of maltreatment, ending in tragic abandonment. This version 




a ‘proper’ guardian. The animal is compared to a child, or to a member of the kinship 
network, whose care is represented as a lifetime commitment, excluding all possibility of 
interruption, let alone abandonment. This is actually where the argumentation based on 
kinship ties becomes more powerful. A set of normative representations about contemporary 
kinship and family come to the surface, in which bonding ties are seen as unbreakable, at 
odds with the diversity of experiences of ‘real families’ when facing several forms of rupture 
and reorganization, from divorce, remarriage, couples living apart together, lone parenthood, 
singlehood, etc. Such normative representations are used to perform a version of animals in 
which they remain under the eternal stewardship of humans. In particular, the animal is 
compared to a child, as someone who lacks the full competences of the adults. But while 
children grow up and become adults themselves, this is not the case with this emergent 
version of animals as victims, who seem to remain indefinitely in a ‘child-like’ stage which 
claims full protection from humans. In this sense, the boundary between human and non-
human animals is reinforced, undermining our thinking of companion animals as autonomous 
subjects.  
On the other hand, the ‘counter-narrative’ from the adopter and his very few defenders 
produce a version of Daphne as the ‘animal-maladjusted.’ This is a version in which she is 




that it entails: the other humans, the space in the house, the other animals living there. In this 
version, the core argumentation comes mainly from the description of the interaction between 
Daphne and her surrounding environment, during the year in which she lived with the 
adopter. Hence, it highlights the heterogeneity and relationality of animal practices, how they 
are composed of different types of elements, organized in specifically ordered categories: 
persons (adopter and partner), objects (desk, litter box), buildings and material arrangements 
(the house), other animals (the other cat). However, even though all these elements play an 
important part in the way the story unfolds, in this version of Daphne she, more than the other 
elements involved, is held responsible (by the adopter) for the crucial failure of the adoption 
process. The description of their ‘bodily choreography’ (eg how she hides when the adopter 
tries to reach her; or avoids all forms of contact; or huffs) follows a pattern of estrangement 
that will eventually lead to her being returned to the shelter. And that pattern of estrangement 
is mainly built over the features of her personality and her emotional states. She is depicted 
as unsociable, rejecting human approaches, and eventually aggressive. It is as if all emotions 
are placed on the side of Daphne, the animal; while humans are depicted as trying to deal 
‘rationally’ with ‘Daphne-the-problem.’ Moreover, this highlights how animal practices 
show up the contingency and ‘messiness’ of the common worlds of humans and animals, 




friendly and a member of the group, these practices render her a ‘problematic animal,’ whom 
humans eventually felt it was impossible to live with.  
Therefore, the same animal, Daphne, a cat, is differently enacted by these performative 
practices.  Daphne as an ‘animal-victim’ is mainly depicted as an element of a particular 
species, felines, represented as having behaviors specific to her species, and possibly 
problematic.  Daphne as an ‘animal-maladjusted,’ on the other hand, is mostly described as 
an individual with a ‘problematic’ personality, when compared to other members of her 
species, such as the other cat in the house, other cats the adopter has owned, and his own 
representations of felines.  
This double-edged representation of Daphne highlights the contingent and relational identity 
of animals, how they are ‘done’ and ‘undone’ in the unfolding of actions in which they 
participate to a certain extent. It challenges conceptions of the ‘animal’ as an ontological 
entity, pre-existing its encounters with the world: nature, humans, material and technological 
objects. It illustrates how ‘flesh and blood’ nonhuman animals are not fixed ontologies; rather 
they are contingent, ever changing, emergent entities. They are constant becomings. 
Emerging from their entanglements with the world around them, their ontological condition 




This is not the same as saying that the animal is not a singular being, with her own and unique 
point of view, which remains in great part inaccessible to us, as Derrida (1997) put it. In fact, 
it is possible that it is precisely this condition of radical alterity, of absolute otherness, that 
brings about the discomfort expressed in the humans’ attitudes and narratives about her. Like 
Derrida’s cat, Daphne triggers an uncomfortable questioning among the humans, in this case 
about what it means to be ‘a good human’ and a ‘good guardian’. Also made of feelings of 
shame, mainly enacted in the public shaming of the adopter and his decision to return her to 
the shelter. In addition, Daphne’s ‘unsubstitutable singularity’ becomes celebrated through 
the way she is depicted on social media, as singularity resonates well with contemporary 
media language. 
 
In search of a silver lining: where is Daphne the Cat?  
This article reflected upon the ways we build and blur our ideas about companion animals, 
and human-animal boundaries, in our daily lives, and in our exchanges over social media – 
and what effects that may have on the animals that are constantly being kept at a distance, as 
an unsurmountable Otherness, despite all blurring of boundaries. Drawing on a case study of 
a story about a rescued cat, in an animal shelter, the article explored the construction of 




interactions on social media, and therefore do not ‘reflect reality ‘as it is’ but rather constitute 
a meta-reality: a reality built over other realities, summoned to support one’s beliefs, values 
and views of the world. In this particular case, of what it means to adopt a companion animal, 
specifically a cat, and what we can assume about humans from their behavior in this situation.  
Challenging essentialist views and assumptions about ‘feline nature’, the concept of animal 
practices enabled us to observe how the animality of companion animals is (re)configured, 
in relation to humans, their expectations and experiences; as well as non-humans (other 
animals, material objects in the home and shelter, technologies). Technology becomes 
particularly relevant, as Daphne’s participation in these entanglements is reproduced and 
expanded in time and space through a range of social media practices. As such, technology 
(in its both material and immaterial forms, as in the case of specific affordances) participates 
decisively in the definition of Daphne’s practices that depend on distant relations and 
contexts (Law and Miele 2011). Furthermore, as a capacity to cause an impact or affect a 
network of actants, Daphne’s agency is not only circumscribed to the practices in which she 
physically participates, but also to the ones that are extended in time and place and in which 
she no longer directly participates. 
Paradoxically, Daphne, the Cat herself becomes invisible as her story unfolds along the 




from the shelter and from the adopter. Then, it either is distorted or simply fades away leaving 
room for the particular story/ies each Facebook user brings to the discussion: stories about 
their own pets, their own processes of adoption and mutual adaptation, stories of conflict and 
having to deal with ‘problematic’ behavior. However, even in these stories, the protagonists 
are seldom the animals themselves, but rather their human keepers. In particular, the good 
deeds of humans around the act of adopting, of resisting returning the animal despite the 
problems of mutual adaptation, of struggling to build a life in which the rescued animals, and 
all their possible ‘problematic’ conduct, may be accommodated. 
Hence, Daphne’s existence is approached from a humanized perspective, in two ways. In 
relation to what has been called here the ‘trigger-narrative,’ that of the animal shelter and its 
defenders, she is compared to kinship categories, mostly ‘children,’ and a member of the 
‘family.’ This comparison blurs the line between her and her human fellows and is used to 
contend that, once an animal is taken under human guardianship, under no conditions is it 
justifiable to dispose of him/her. As one does not ‘return’ a child to its birthplace, likewise 
one never returns an adopted animal. The return of an animal is thus equated with an 
abandonment, and all interactions around this produce a version of Daphne as the ‘animal-
victim.’ Paradoxically, this withdraws from her a kind of agency that would enable the 




By contrast, the ‘counter-narrative’ of the adopter and his few followers compares Daphne 
to assumptions about the sociable behavior expected of an ‘ideal feminised human’: to be 
gregarious, docile, caring, kind. She is therefore defined as an ‘animal-maladjusted,’ who has 
failed in the endeavor of adapting to the humans who gave her shelter.  
Therefore, Daphne, the Cat, becomes an effect of these ‘animal practices,’ performed by 
humans and non-humans, during the adoption period (reported by the adopter), after her 
return to the shelter (reported by the latter), and in the digital space-time of social media, the 
exchanges and interactions through the thread of posts telling and commenting on her story. 
Both humans and non-humans participate in these ‘animal practices’: the adopter(s), the 
shelter keepers, Daphne, other cat(s), animals, and the wider cultural context in which ‘cats’ 
are constructed, including the rescued animals of the Facebook users, the space of the house 
and of the shelter, food and drink, and the technological tools and environment of social 
media, including its specific affordances.  
Hence, different practices, including discursive practices performed on social media, 
construct different versions of the same animal: the ‘animal-victim’ and the ‘animal-
maladjusted.’ Through these practices, there is a kind of pendular movement between erasing 
and reinstalling differences between animals and humans. Erasing, as when Daphne, cats 




network that one can never relinquish, from a moral point of view. Reinstalling, as when 
Daphne is denied morality and intentional behavior, declared incapable of doing any harm 
by means of belonging to a different (non-human) species. Both versions represent human-
animal boundaries as insurmountable, highlighting the ambivalence that crosscuts the 
attitudes of humans towards non-human animals. 
Finally, in these digital discursive practices that intend to have the ‘animal question’ at their 
core, animals remain paradoxically ‘invisible,’ despite their apparent extreme visibility. So, 
where is Daphne, the Cat? Either she disappears or is redefined as a caricature. I have 
advanced the idea that, being at the same time present and absent, nonhuman animals may 
form a new kind of ‘absent-referent.’ A relevant question, thus, is whether sociology can 
contribute to restore animals, and Daphne in this particular case, from their digital “absent-
referent” condition. I argue that sociology may play a role in this matter, and I have tried to 
show how its contribution may unfold (at least) in two ways: by deconstructing the ways 
animals are defined in the course of human-animal practices, in spite of being repeatedly put 
on the side of ‘nature’, and through this, uncovering the ‘naturalization’ of animals; by 
identifying the processes through which certain ideas of nonhuman animals are constructed 
and reproduced, in order to preserve the status quo based on species, gender or other form of 




Trying to find Daphne, the Cat, herself, thus raises important questions. First, drawing 
exclusively on discourses about Daphne is certainly a limitation of this research, as I did not 
engage directly with the animal, excluding her from my field of (direct) attention. Such 
methodological circumstances also contributed somewhat to the invisibility of Daphne, and 
hence to reproduce the general invisibility of nonhuman animals, in human-animal relations. 
Second, it raises questions about power relations between humans and nonhumans, and the 
anthropocentric distribution of resources in which non-human animals always occupy a 
disadvantaged position (Carter and Charles, 2011, p. 11).  
It is true that, as ANT defends, power within these webs of relations is also contingent, 
subject to constant change. It does not exclusively run top-down. Humans exert their power 
over Daphne in different ways, as described previously. However, these are unstable 
balances, and ones that Daphne is also able to affect. When she urinates outside her litter box, 
for example, she affects her human guardians, and has the power to change the family 
equilibrium. When she refuses to eat, she affects the shelter’s staff, their decisions, their time, 
their practices and behaviours, their beliefs (vg. about her health status). However, in the end 
of the day, the fact that she is being held in captivity makes her more vulnerable than the 
humans involved, in the long term. In this sense, the life of Daphne, as all nonhuman animals, 




occupies a disadvantaged position. Her agential conditions are modified beyond her will, as 
when the humans decide where she is supposed to live (the shelter, the house, the shelter 
again). Moreover, her choices, when exercised, are already circumscribed: she may choose 
not to eat, but she is under technical and medical surveillance, to secure her survival.  
The story of Daphne has triggered a reflection on whether animals are the effects of social 
practices in which they, too, participate, rather than entities that pre-exist any kind of 
interaction with the world around them.  Several elements, human and non-human, 
contributed to these ‘animal practices’. Extended in time and place, beyond the specific 
contexts in which they were triggered, these practices gained new breadth in the digital time-
place of social media, whose particular affordances augmented the intensity of the exchanges 
involved. In all this, Daphne remains the weakest link, the least powerful part in this relation 
between human and non-human.  
 
References 
Adams, C. (1999).  The Sexual Politics of Meat. New York and London: Continuum. 
Agamben, G. (2004). The Open: Man and Animal (1st ed.; W. Hamacher, ed.). Standford: 




Policarpo, V. (2019). The personal life of Facebook: Managing friendships with social 
media. Families, Relationships and Societies, 8(3), 445–461. 
https://doi.org/10.1332/204674318X15313160549810  
Baym, N. K. (2010). Personal connections in the digital age. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Beck, A. M. & Katcher, A. H. (1996). Between pets and people: the importance of animal 
companionship. Purdue University Press. 
Carter, B. & Charles, N. (2011). Humans and Other Animals. Critical Perspectives. 
Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Chambers, D. (2013). Social media and personal relationships : online intimacies and 
networked friendship, Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Charles, N. & Davies, C. (2008) ‘‘My Family and Other Animals’: Pets as Kin.’ 
Sociological Research Online, 13(5), 2008. doi:10.5153/sro.1798. 
Charles, N. (2014). ‘Animals Just Love You as You Are’: Experiencing Kinship across the 
Species Barrier. Sociology, 48(4), pp. 715-730. 
Cole, M. & Stewart, K. (2014). Our Children and Other Animals. The Cultural 
Construction of Human-Animal Relations in Childhood. Ashgate Publishing. 
Couldry, N. (2012). Media, Society, World: Social Theory and Digital Media Practice, 
Wiley. 




between patriarchy and anthroparchy, using examples of meat and pornography. PhD 
thesis, University of Leeds, School of Sociology and Social Policy. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004  
De Fina, A. & Georgakopoulou, A. (eds) (2015). The Handbook of Narrative Analysis. 
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Derrida J.; David Wills (1997, 2002) The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow), 
Critical Inquiry, Vol. 28, No. 2. (Winter, 2002), pp. 369-418. 
Filippi, Massimo (2017) Questioni di Specie, Eleuthèra. 
Fudge, E. (2002). Animal. FOCI. 
Fudge, E. (2008). Pets. Routledge. 
Lambert, A. (2015). Intimacy and social capital on Facebook: Beyond the psychological 
perspective. New Media & Society, 18(11), pp.2559–2575. 
Latour, B. (1999). On Recalling Ant. The Sociological Review, 47(1_suppl), 15–25. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.1999.tb03480.x 
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling The Social: an Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (1st 
ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Law, J. (1999). After Ant: Complexity, Naming and Topology. The Sociological Review, 




Law, J. and Miele, M. (2011). ‘Animal Practices.’ In Cartes, b. & Charles, N. (2011) (Eds.). 
Human and Other Animals, 50-65. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Madianou, M. (2016). Ambient co-presence: Transnational family practices in polymedia 
environments. Global Networks, 16(2), pp.183–201. 
McVeigh-Schultz, J. & Baym, N. K. (2015). ‘Thinking of You: Vernacular Affordance in 
the Context of the Microsocial Relationship App, Couple.’ Social Media + Society, 
1(2). 
Redmalm, D. (2015). ‘Pet grief: When is non-human life grievable?’ The Sociological 
Review, 63(1), pp. 19-35. 
Serpell, J. (1996). In the company of animals: a study of human-animal relationships. 
Cambridge University Press.  
Tuan, Y. (1984). Dominance and affection : the making of pets. Yale University Press, 
1984. 
 
 
 
